来源:思勉人文高等研究院

【预告】10月23日张子立:论王阳明良知说——翻译、音译与诠释(思勉午餐沙龙59 / 思勉2013校庆报告)

来源:思勉人文高等研究院发布时间:2013-10-16浏览次数:48

主题:论王阳明良知说:翻译、音译与诠释(On Wang Yangming’s Theory of Liangzhi: Translation, Transliteration and Interpretation)
主讲:张子立(华东师范大学思勉人文高等研究院青年研究员)
评论/主持:郁振华(华东师范大学哲学系教授、博士生导师)
时间:2013年10月23日(星期三)11:45-13:45
地点:闵行校区人文楼5303学术报告厅
主办:华东师范大学思勉人文高等研究院

内容简介:
In this article, I try to argue that it would be more appropriate to use transliteration than literal translation when inquiring into the notion of liangzhi. And the interpretation of liangzhi into innate, original or cognitive knowledge would incur “the interpretative morass regarding knowledge.”
Firstly, for Wang, what innate in man is moral agency other than a certain kind of knowledge, be it innate or empirical. Therefore the focus of zhih-zhi and ge-wu is rather on moral practice and the realization of virtue within people than on either “the extension of knowledge” or “the investigation of things.” Such translations have not only given rise to interpretative deviation from Chinese text but also evoked ensuing hassles.
Apart from that, the adoption of cognitive or objective knowledge to elucidate liangzhi also leads to gratuitous twist of English words and phrases and stokes some conundrums. There are three misconceptions concerning this issue: liangzhi as perfect or innate knowledge, the identity of knowledge and action, the ambiguous notion of action. Those misconstructions have been clarified and followed by the exposition of the correlation among liangzhi itself and three types of zhi. Liangzhi itself is the metaphysical creative principle and our moral agency as capacity for moral judgment as well as the motivation of moral conduct is the manifestation of liangzhi itself. Zhi-tian-li is exactly our judgment of right and wrong. Empirical knowledge serves as the assistance of liangzhi for the fulfillment of the latter’s directions while moral knowledge refers to either our moral agency or the fruit of cooperation between moral agency and empirical knowledge.

主讲简介:
张子立,台湾基隆人,台湾政治大学哲学博士,并于该校进行博士后研究,负责“中国哲学的现代诠释”研究计划,先后任教于台湾东华大学、东海大学、台北科技大学。研究领域为儒家哲学、现代新儒学与伦理学,特别是从与西方伦理学的比较研究,以及当前社会的具体情境中,探讨如何进行儒家的现代诠释。  主要发表包括:台湾行政院国家科学委员会《台湾地区近五十年来哲学学门研究成果详细报告——当代中国哲学民国部分》,《试析道德的形上学两种创生型态:“本体宇宙论的创生”与“实现物自身的创生”》,《再论朱子归入自律伦理学的可能性》,《释朱子脱然贯通说》,《道德感之普遍性与动力性——谢勒与牟宗三的共识》,“Reflections on Wang Yangming’s Theory of Liangzhi in Light of Moral Practice and Moral Judgment”。