时 间：2022年10月19日15:00
地 点：腾讯会议ID:811-916-088
报告人：王天翔 助理教授
主持人：石芸 副教授
摘 要：
We study a decentralized admission control problem with capacity borrowing. In this problem, the admission decision is made by each server who is assigned dedicated capacity. However, a server can borrow capacity from other servers if his dedicated capacity is exhausted. The borrower compensates the lender by a payment equal to the ``borrowing cost''. Hence, the servers share their capacities via borrowing, but they also compete against each other for their pooled capacities. We formulate this problem as a stochastic dynamic game and characterize the equilibrium strategic admission behavior of servers. We show that the critical factors that affect the equilibrium behavior and the system revenue are the magnitude of the borrowing cost, the arrival rate of customers and the revenue difference between different classes of customers. We have identified conditions under which servers maximizing their own payoffs end up making decisions that benefit the system. Our study highlights the important roles that the borrowing cost plays in shaping servers' behavior in service systems and provides concrete guidance for practitioners to design a decentralized admission control system.
报告人简介：
王天翔，华东师范大学助理教授。本科毕业于复旦大学数学科学学院数学与应用数学专业，博士毕业于复旦大学管理学院管理科学与工程系。在管理学顶级期刊《Production and Operations Management》、自动控制领域顶级期刊《Automatica》、运筹学国际一流期刊《European Journal of Operational Research》等SCI期刊发表学术论文多篇，并担任《Automatica》、《Fundamental Research》、《Journal of Simulation》等期刊的审稿人。主要研究方向包括仿真优化的算法开发与应用，金融工程，医疗运营优化等。